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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether research and development (R&D) intensity affects the firm’s 
financing decisions. We use a sample of European firms in the period 2002-2011. We argue 
that R&D asset has three fundamentals characteristics that make it different from ordinary 
investment and constrain financing choices of the firm. First, The R&D is a specific non-
redeployable asset with higher premium risk. Second, it generates stronger growth 
opportunities and, third, represents a major contributor to asymmetric information. Based on 
the implications of the transaction cost theory, the agency cost and pecking order theory, we 
argue that these fundamentals characteristics affect the financial policy. Our results show that 
R&D-intensive firms exhibit lower leverage, a shorter debt maturity, a lower dividend 
payment and a higher cash level.   
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1. Introduction 
The corporate finance studies have widely shown that the asset structure influences the 
financial policy of the firm.  
Our paper fits in this research area by studying whether R&D intensity influences the 
firm’s financing decisions. We argue that R&D has specific characteristics which differentiate 
it from ordinary investment. First, R&D is a non- redeployable specific asset, because it 
presents for any other firm a lower value than the owner assigns to him (Bah and Dumontier, 
1998). Williamson (1988) argues that specific assets have lower liquidation and 
hypothecation value, which increases the premium risk required by the debtholders. Hence, 
firms with more specific assets prefer equity financing to debt because of the higher costs of 
external financing.    
Second, R&D is also an asset which generates large growth opportunities. According to 
the agency theory, firms with larger growth options should exhibit lower leverage because of 
the under-investment (Myers, 1977) and the asset substitution problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). If they have to finance by debt, short term debt is privileged because it 
matures before execution of investment option. These firms distribute also lower dividend 
since the free cash flow is entirely absorbed by the growth opportunities.  
R&D asset is also synonymous of informational asymmetry. The information 
concerning the R&D activity is little revealed by the managers to investors fearing it might be 
used by potential competitors. So, these firms privilege internal financing. In the same way, 
Myers and Majluf (1984) explain in the pecking order theory that firms with high 
informational asymmetry prefer financing their investments by internal funds. Failing this 
resource, they finance them by debt and exceptionally by security markets.  
Based on these three characteristics, we presume that R&D-intensive firms must exhibit 
lower debt level, shorter debt maturity and lower dividend payments. To test these 
hypotheses, we use a sample of European firms in the period (2002-2011) with univariate and 
multivariate analyses. Our empirical evidence confirms that R&D-intensive firms have 
specific corporate finance behaviour. Their financial policy is characterised by lower leverage 
and dividend payment ratio and higher proportion of short term debt and cash reserves than 
non-R&D firms
1
. 
This study offers interesting insights in two ways. Firstly, it provides theoretical 
framework for the corporate finance of R&D-intensive firms. Secondly, to our knowledge, 
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few papers have been devoted to study the effect of R&D on financing decisions while this 
investment is a crucial factor of innovation and competitiveness. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 argues theoretically the 
relation between R&D investment and the firm’s financing decisions. Section 3 presents the 
empirical design. Section 4 is devoted to empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. R&D investment and financing decisions 
2.1. R&D and asset specificity 
The R&D is a specific asset
2
 as illustrated by Williamson (1988). According to this author an 
asset is specific, if it is not reusable without losing totality or a part of its utilisation value. 
R&D investment requires the acquisition of special machines and very sophisticated 
technologies which cannot be used in an employment other than that for what they were 
acquired. These machines constitute a capital not easily redeployable in the case of project 
failure. R&D is also an asset marked also by exceptional human competences. Using a 
statistic models, Titman (1984) explains that the costs supported by customers and employees 
in bankruptcy oblige firms producing specific product to favour internal financing. For the 
customers, the bankruptcy leads to the loss of futures services like maintenance or the after-
sales services. For the employees, this human capital is very specific because the knowledge 
acquired is not easily transferable without suffering damage. Alderson and Betker (1996), find 
that liquidation costs are positively correlated with R&D investments. Hall and Lerner (2009) 
explain that the sunk costs associated with R&D investment are higher than that for ordinary 
investment. For these authors, “Banks and other debtholders prefer to use physical assets to 
secure loans and are reluctant to lend when the project involves substantial R&D investment 
rather than investment in plant and equipment”.  
Campello and Giambona (2012) and Qiu and La (2010) find that the redeployability of 
tangible assets increases borrowing capacity because it allows creditors to more easily 
repossess a bankrupt firm’s assets. When the firm has lower assets’ liquidation values, the 
debtholders will require high premium risk which increases transaction costs. Consequently, 
firms more involved in specific assets, as R&D, will face difficulty when they resort to debt 
and have to rely on equity financing (Harris and Raviv, 1990; Bah and Dumontier, 1998, 
2001; Hall and Lerner, 2009; Wang and Tornhill, 2010). Benmelech (2009) concludes that 
asset redeployability affects debt maturity. 
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2.2. R&D and growth opportunities 
It is generally recognized that R&D activities create strong growth opportunities (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Lööf and Heshmati, 2005; 
Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen, 2009)
3
.  
The concept of growth opportunities was developed by Myers (1977) to study the effect 
of the nature of investment on financing decisions of the firm.  He defines the value of the 
firm as the sum of assets in place and growth opportunities perceived as growth options 
presented to the firm that can be followed or not. The exercise of such options in the future 
requires additional discretionary expenditure. However, the assets in place do not require such 
expenditure, because they form a part of the firm’s patrimony and do not influence in any way 
its growth potential. 
 The agency theory shows that the growth opportunities affect the financial structure of 
the firm, by i) the under-investment, ii) the assets substitution and iii) the free cash-flow 
problems. 
i) The under-investment problem  
Myers (1977) explains that the indebtedness of the firm decreases its possibilities of 
investment. Indeed, any increase in debt value will profit to debtholders but not to 
shareholders. Beyond a certain level of debt (debt risky), a manager who protects 
shareholders’ interest can refuse to undertake these growth opportunities, because they lead to 
an increase in the debt value rather than the equity value. In other terms, firms may renounce 
profitable projects when the advantages will be allocated essentially to the debtholders. Myers 
(1977) calls this situation an underinvestment problem. 
   To avoid this situation, Myers (1977) recommends financing these growth 
opportunities by short-term debts. Shorter debt maturity allows a continual and gradual debt 
negotiation and matures before the growth option can be exercised.   
ii) The asset substitution problem 
Black and Scoles (1973) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that the issuance of debt can 
lead to a modification of owner-manager’s investment policy. In substituting a less risky 
investment policy by a more risky one, the manager has the possibility to transfer a wealth 
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from creditors to shareholders, even if the riskier investment project has lower economic 
value.  
To face up to the asset substitution problem, related to the undertaking of projects with 
higher risk than that for which the debt was emitted and evaluated, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) recommend less debt for the firms with strong growth opportunities.  
iii) The problem of free cash-flow 
The free cash-flow represents the liquidity remaining once the investments, with net positive 
present value, were financed. It appears in the majority of cases that the managers do not hold 
the entirety capital of the firm. On this assumption, they cannot profit completely from their 
efforts. Thus, managers may devote less time and efforts to control the firm, and focus their 
attention on projects from which they derive alone satisfactions.  
In a moral hazard situation, the free cash-flow is at the disposal of managers for a 
discretionary uses. The increase in dividend payment represents a first way to reduce this free 
cash flow. The second way consists in modifying the financial policy in favor of a higher 
indebtedness. The payment of financial charges decreases the liquidity and the risk of the 
manager’s opportunistic behavior. When growth opportunities increase, the free cash-flow 
decreases because it is absorbed by these opportunities, therefore, the firm distributes less 
dividend and the recourse to the debt will not be necessary to discipline the managers. 
Many empirical studies have confirmed that growth opportunities affect the firm’s 
financing decisions.  Titman and Wessels (1988) propose a debt model which integrates 
measurements of growth opportunities. Indicators of growth include capital expenditures, 
total assets growth and R&D over sales ratio.  The results provide evidence of negative 
relation between debt and growth opportunities.  Mackie-Mason (1990) has tested the effect 
of under-investment and asset substitution problems and find, through a probit model, a 
negative relation between growth opportunities and the probability of emitting debt. 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004) and Hovakimian (2006) conclude that market 
to book ratio, as measure of growth opportunities, is negatively related to leverage level. 
However, Chen and Zhao (2006) find that the relation between market to book ratio and 
leverage is not robust.  They show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios use more debt, 
and those with lower market-to-book ratios retire more debt.  
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Barclay and Smith, (1995),  Bevan and Danbolt, (2002) and  Benmelech (2009) have 
tested the relation between growth and debt maturity and have concluded that growth 
opportunities increase the short term debt financing (as recommended by Myers, 1977).  The 
model of Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) predicts that financially unconstrained firms with few 
growth opportunities prefer senior debt, while financially constrained firms, with or without 
growth opportunities, prefer junior debt. 
Regarding dividend, a number of studies have shown that firms with high growth 
opportunities pay lower dividend (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992; Holder, 
Langrehr and Hexter, 1998; Utami and Inanga, 2011). The growth opportunities absorb the 
free cash flow which leads to lower dividend payment ratio. 
2.3. R&D and information asymmetry 
Prior literature has shown that R&D investment increases informational asymmetry between 
the firm and its environment. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) explain that firms with high 
specific assets are less easily controllable and more confronted to informational problem than 
those with low specific assets.  
Kamien and Schwartz (1978) show that firms involved in R&D activities are reluctant 
to reveal information about their research project fearing that it might be used by potential 
competitors.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) explain in the pecking order theory that, in the case of high 
information asymmetry, firms prefer finance their investments first by self-financing, second 
by less risky debts, and finally by shares issues.  
The authors show that when investors are less informed than the managers about the 
true value of assets and prospects, the firm value can be underestimated by the market. If the 
firm emits new shares to finance an investment project with high information asymmetry, new 
shareholders can profit from a net present value higher than that of the project to finance, 
which results in a clear loss for the old shareholders. As a result, the project is rejected even if 
its net present value is positive because of the financing mode. To favor the self-financing, the 
firms with higher information asymmetry should pay lower dividend and exhibit higher cash 
level. 
Bharat, Pasquariello and Wu (2008) and Autore and Kovacs (2009) have studied the 
implications of the pecking order theory and find that  firms prefer to access financial markets 
and issue equity when the level of information asymmetry is low. An, Hardin III and Wu 
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(2012) find that firms with more severe information asymmetry are less likely to have access 
to bank credit lines. Concurrently, more transparent firms are more likely to utilize bank 
credit lines as opposed to cash for liquidity management.  
3. Empirical design 
3.1. Hypotheses 
Our theoretical framework presumes that R&D investment has specific characteristics which 
determine financing choices of the firm.  First, R&D asset has lower liquidation value which 
increases the risk premium required by the debtholders. According to the cost transaction 
theory, R&D-intensive firms will exhibit lower leverage because of the higher cost of debt. 
Second, The R&D activity generates strong growth opportunities. Based on the agency 
theory, the firms strongly involved in R&D activity should exhibit lower leverage level and 
higher proportion of short term debt to reduce the under-investment and asset substitution 
problems related to these growth opportunities. Moreover, these firms should pay lower 
dividend because the free cash flows is entirely absorbed by the growth options. Third, R&D 
asset is also an important contributor to information asymmetry. Managers prefer not 
revealing information about their R&D investment fearing that the information will be used 
by potential competitors, so they distribute lower dividend to increase internal finance. In 
addition, in accordance with the pecking order theory, R&D-intensive firms should exhibit 
higher cash reserves and, therefore, lower dividend payment ratio. Consequently, the paper 
tests the following hypotheses: 
     Hypothesis 1: The R&D-intensive firms exhibit lower debt level and higher proportion 
of short term debt. 
     Hypothesis 2: The R&D-intensive firms distribute lower dividend.  
    Hypothesis 3: The R&D-intensive firms exhibit higher cash.  
3.2. Sample selection and data description 
Our paper tests the effect of R&D investment on financial policy of European firms over the 
period 2002-2011. All the data are extracted from WOLDSCOPE database. The firms 
belonging to the financial and service sectors are removed from the initial sample because of 
their atypical financial policy behavior. Selected firms must have data concerning their R&D 
expenditures and financial variables. According to these criteria, the final sample consists of 
586 European firms and represents 4757 firm-year observations. 
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The observations have been decomposed into tertiles based on the R&D expenditures to 
sales ratio. Our study focuses on the extremes, upper and lower, tertiles which represent 
respectively the groups of R&D-intensive firms and non-R&D firms
4
. The median tertile 
represents the normal-R&D group. Table 1 describes the whole sample and the subsamples.  
Table 1. Sample Description 
 Number Lower tertile (Non-
R&D)  
Median tertile Upper tertile 
(R&D-intensive)  
Initial  Sample  1069     
Firms with R&D Reported 586    
Total obs  (2002-2011) 4757    
Mean R&D/sales  
Median R&D/sales  
 0.009 
0.011 
0.072 
0.051 
0.225*** 
0.191*** 
Note: The table indicates the number of firms for the initial sample, for those with R&D reported and the number of 
observations for the period (2002-2011).  For each tertile, the table shows also the mean and median of R&D to sales ratio. 
The upper and lower tertiles represent respectively the groups of R&D- intensive firms and non-R&D firms.  
*** indicates that means (t-test) and medians differences (Wilcoxon test) between R&D- intensive firms and non-R&D firms 
are significant at 1% level.  
3.3. Variable definition  
We test whether the R&D-intensive firms exhibit lower debt, and in case of debt financing 
they prefer short term debt (H1). We test also whether R&D-intensive firms exhibit lower 
dividend payment (H2) and higher proportion of cash (H3). 
Financial structure is studied by leverage, short term debt, dividend payment and cash 
level. Leverage (LEV) is total debt to total asset ratio. Short term debt (SHTD), as measure of 
debt maturity, is measured as short term debt and current portion of long term debt to total 
debt ratio. Dividend (DIV) is measured as the ratio dividend per share to earnings before 
extraordinary items. Cash level (CASH) is defined as the ratio of cash plus short term 
investment to total assets. 
The R&D intensity appears as an independent qualitative variable (R&D) which takes 
the value 1 for R&D-intensive firms (high tertile) and 0 for the non-R&D firms (low tertile).  
Several variables are used to control the effect of R&D intensity on financial policy. 
The papers of Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1990) and Guedes and Opler 
(1996),  have shown that profitability, asset specificity, growth opportunities, risk, size, and 
the non-debt tax shields influence total debt and short term debt.  Rozeff (1982), Jensen et al. 
(1992), Baker, Saudi, Dutta and Gandhi (2007) explain that dividend is related to profitability, 
asset specificity growth opportunities, risk, size, and capital needs.  Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (1999) and Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) have presented also these 
variables as a determinant of cash.   
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Profitability is measured both by return on assets and return on equity ratios (Bah and 
Dumontier, 2001). The return on assets (ROA) is operating income to total assets ratio. The 
return on equity (ROE) is determined by earning before extraordinary items ratio to total 
equity. Asset specificity (SPECIFCITY) is approximated by advertising to total assets ratio 
(Hennart, 1991). Growth opportunities (GROWTH) is measured as the market to book ratio 
(Chen and Zhao, 2006; Hoviakimian, 2006). Huang and Song (2002) approximate the risk by 
the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes (RISK). Size is measured as the 
logarithm of market capitalization (Eddy and Seifert, 1988; Redding, 1997). The capital needs 
(CAPEX) is measured as the capital expenditure to total asset ratio where capital expenditure 
is the funds used to acquire new fixed assets (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Bah and Dumontier, 
2001). 
The non-debt tax shields (NDTS) is a variable used by Titman and Wessels (1988) to 
test the determinants of debt. It is calculated by the following relation:  
NDTS = OI – INT - (TAX/T) 
Where T is the effective tax rate, (OI) represents the operating income, (INT) the interest 
payment and (TAX) the income tax payment.  Table 2 displays variables measures. 
Table 2. Variables and measures 
Panel A : Financing decisions variables 
Leverage (LEV)  = Total Debt/Total asset 
Short Term Debt (SHTD) = short term debt and current portion of long term debt / total debt ratio 
Dividend (DIV) = dividend per share / earnings before extraordinary items 
Cash Level (CASH) = cash plus short term investment / total assets. 
Panel B: R&D intensity 
Dummy variable (R&D) = 1 if R&D-intensive firm (upper tertile of R&D/sales) 
                                            0 if non-R&D firm (lower tertile of R&D/sales) 
Panel C: Control variables 
Return on assets (ROA) = operating income / total assets  
Return on equity (ROE) = earning before extraordinary items / total equity. 
Asset specificity (SPECIFCITY) =  advertising expenditures / to total assets   
Growth opportunities (GROWTH) =  market value/ book value   
RISK=  Standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes  
SIZE =  the logarithm of market capitalization 
 Non-debt tax shields (NDTS)= [Operating income- Interest – (Income tax/ Effective tax rate)] / Total assets 
Capital needs (CAPEX)  = capital expenditure / total assets 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive analysis  
The results of table 3 confirm that R&D-intensive firms exhibit lower leverage. For these 
variables, the mean and median difference between R&D-intensive firms and non-R&D firms 
is significant at 1% level. This result confirms our first hypothesis based on the costs 
transaction, under-investment, and asset substitution theories. The table shows also that when 
these firms have to use debt, they prefer significantly the short term debt. The debt maturity 
theory indicates that the short term debt matures before investment opportunities can be 
exercised and therefore it avoids the underinvestment problem. 
The empirical results validate also the dividend hypothesis based on both pecking order 
and free cash flow theories. R&D-intensive firms distribute statistically significant lower 
dividend than non-R&D ones. This confirms that the firms strongly involved in R&D 
activities prefer internal sources of finance to avoid revealing valuable information about their 
investment projects that can be used by potential rivals. Another explication is that the R&D 
intensive firms have lower free cash flow because it is absorbed by the growth opportunities 
and therefore they pay lower dividend. The table reports also that the cash level is 
significantly higher for the R&D-intensive firms which confirm that they favor the self-
financing. 
Table 3. Mean and Median comparison of financing decisions variables between R&D-intensive firms and 
non-R&D firms 
Note: The table reports the mean and median of financing decisions variables for R&D-intensive firms (high tertile of 
R&D), normal R&D firms (median tertile of R&D) and non-R&D firms (low tertile for R&D). Leverage, LEV, is measured 
as total debt to total assets ratio. Short term debt, SHTD, is the ratio short term debt with current portion of long term debt 
to total debt. Dividend payment, DIV, is measured as dividend per share to earnings per share before extraordinary items. 
*** indicates statistical significance of 1% respectively, in mean differences (t-test) and median differences (Wilcoxon test) 
between R&D-intensive firms and non-R&D ones. 
4.2. Multivariate analyses for the effect of R&D on financing decisions 
To complete the univariate analysis, we test through pooled regressions the effect of R&D 
intensity on financial policy variables (LEV, SHTD, DIV and CASH). Previous studies have 
shown that others variables, than R&D intensity, can affect firm’s financing decisions. It was 
Financing decisions 
variables  
 
Obs 
Mean Median 
Non- 
R&D  
Normal 
R&D  
R&D-
intensive  
Non- 
R&D  
Normal 
R&D  
R&D-
intensive  
LEV 4786 0,386 0.234 0,117
*** 0.341 0.187 0.128*** 
SHTD 4786 0.291 0.471 0.579
*** 0.252 0.443 0.552*** 
DIV 4102 0,521 0.374 0,224
*** 0.542 0.385 0.236*** 
CASH 4786 0.142 0.211 0.441
*** 0.121 0.194 0.483*** 
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largely proved that return on asset, asset specificity, growth, risk, size, and non-debt tax shield 
influence leverage and short term debt.  Empirical studies have shown also that dividend and 
cash are associated with return on equity, asset specificity, growth, risk, size and capital 
needs. The models to be tested are as follows: 
   LEV  =  α 0  + α 1 R&D + α 2ROA + α 3SPECIFICITY +  α 4GROWTH + α 5RISK + α 6SIZE +    α 7NDTS + ζ (1) 
    SHTD =  β 0+ β1R&D + β 2ROA +β 3SPECIFICITY +  β 4 GROWTH + β5 RISK +  β 6 SIZE + β 7NDTS + U (2) 
    DIV   =  φ0 + φ1 R&D + φ2 ROE + φ3 SPECIFICITY+φ4 GROWTH +φ5 RISK + φ6 SIZE + φ7 CAPEX +E (3) 
    CASH = µ0 + µ1R&D + µ2ROE + µ3SPECIFICITY + µ4GROWTH + µ5 RISK + µ6 SIZE +  µ7CAPEX + I (4) 
Where LEV is the total debt to total asset ratio and SHTD is short term debt and current 
portion of long term debt to total debt ratio. The short term debt is used to test the debt 
maturity theory. R&D is a dummy variable which equals one if the firm is an R&D-intensive 
firm and zero if is non-R&D one. DIV is the ratio dividend per share to earnings before 
extraordinary items. The level of cash, CASH, is measured as the ratio of cash plus short term 
investment to total assets. 
The return on asset, ROA, is measured as operating income to total asset. The return on 
equity, ROE, is earning before extraordinary items to total equity. SPECIFICITY is 
advertising expenditures to total asset ratio. GROWTH is the market to book ratio. RISK is 
approximated by the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes. SIZE is 
determined by the logarithm of market capitalisation. The capital needs, CAPEX, is measured 
as the capital expenditure to total asset ratio. The non-debt tax shield, NDTS is the operating 
income minus interest payment and the ratio of income tax to effective tax rate. 
The results reported in table 4 reinforce those of the univariate analysis and confirm a 
significant negative relation between leverage and R&D intensity even after controlling 
profitability, growth opportunities, asset specificity, risk, size, and non-debt tax shield
5
. The 
R&D variable having three fundamental characteristics (asset specificity, growth 
opportunities and informational asymmetry), presents a significant coefficient compared to 
the significance of these criteria taken independently of each other. This result confirms our 
first hypothesis and joins that found by Bah and Dumontier (2001).  
For the control variables, the relation between return on asset and leverage is 
statistically significant and negative while the size affects positively the total debt. The asset 
specificity and the growth have, as predicted, a negative and significant effect on leverage. 
12 
 
The relation between risk and total debt is insignificant. The non-debt tax shields is negatively 
correlated with total debt. A large non-debt tax shields reduces the expected value of interest 
tax savings and lessens the advantage of debt financing (Downs, 1993). Thus, leverage 
decreases with the non-debt tax shields. 
 
Table 4 shows also that firms more involved in R&D activity prefer short term maturity 
when they have to finance by debt. The relation between these variables is positive and 
significant. This result corroborates the debt maturity theory presented by Myers (1977) as a 
solution for the underinvestment problem. The importance of debt maturity is also proved by 
the positive and significant relation between short term debt and growth. The asset specificity 
and the non-debt tax shields are positively correlated with short term debt.  
The results regarding dividend policy provide evidence that R&D-intensive firms 
distribute lower dividend even after controlling profitability, growth, specificity, size, risk and 
capital needs. The relation between dividend payout ratio and R&D dummy variable is 
  Table 4. Effect of R&D intensity on financing decisions 
LEV    = α0 + α1 R&D + α2 ROA + α3 SPECIFICITY + α4 GROWTH + α5 RISK + α6 SIZE + α7 NDTS + ζ (1) 
SHTD = β0 + β1 R&D + β2 ROA + β 3 SPECIFICITY + β 4 GROWTH + β5 RISK + β6 SIZE + β7 NDTS + u (2) 
DIV    = φ0 + φ1 R&D + φ2 ROE + φ3 SPECIFICITY+ φ4 GROWTH + φ5 RISK + φ6 SIZE + φ7 CAPEX + E (3) 
CASH = µ0 + µ1 R&D + µ2 ROE + µ3 SPECIFICITY + µ4 GROWTH + µ5 RISK + µ6 SIZE + µ7 CAPEX + I (4) 
Explanatory variables 
Financing Decisions Variables 
LEV 
(α) 
SHTD 
(β) 
DIV 
(φ) 
CASH 
( µ) 
Intercept 1,747
* 1.079 1,959** 1.705* 
R&D -8,256
*** 3.065*** -5,348*** 7.025*** 
ROA -2,088
* -1.645 - - 
ROE - - 3.325
*** 1.314 
SPECIFICITY -3,146
*** 2.059* -2.824** 2.445** 
GROWTH -3,479
* 2.125** -4.472*** 4.102*** 
RISK -1,065 0.933 -1.497 1.914
* 
SIZE 2,122
** -1.567* 1.825** 1.114 
NDTS -3,212
*** 2.708** - - 
CAPEX - - -1.475
* 2.412** 
Adjusted R
2
 0,333 0.241 0.187 0.194 
Note: The table reports results of pooled regressions of financing decisions variables on R&D intensity variable and the 
others controls variables for the period (2002-2011). R&D is dummy variable which takes the value one if the firms is an 
R&D-intensive firm and zero if the firm is non-R&D one.  Leverage, LEV, is measured as total debt to total assets ratio. 
Short term debt, SHTD, is the ratio short term debt with current portion of long term debt to total debt.  Dividend payment, 
DIV, is measured as dividend per share to earnings per share before extraordinary items. The return on asset, ROA, is 
measured as operating income to total asset. SPECIFICITY is advertising expenditures to total asset ratio. GROWTH is the 
market to book ratio. RISK is approximated by the standard deviation of earnings before interest and taxes. SIZE is 
measured as the logarithm of market capitalisation. The non-debt tax shield, NDTS, is operating income minus interest 
payment and the ratio of income tax to effective tax rate. CAPEX is measured as the capital expenditure to total asset ratio.   
***, ** and * indicate that the t-statistics is significant respectively at 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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negative and statistically significant. This relationship is explained by the information 
asymmetry associated with R&D activity.  
Our findings confirm also that the return on equity affects positively and significantly 
dividend. The firms with high growth opportunities prefer self-financing and, as a result, they 
pay lower dividend.  The risk, as proxy of information asymmetry, is negatively correlated 
with dividend. The size has not significant implication. 
The results of cash model strengthen those of debt and dividend models and ascertain 
that R&D-intensive firms favor the self-financing. The relationship between R&D dummy 
variable and cash is statistically significant and positive. The variables specificity, growth, 
risk and capital needs are, as predicted, positively and significantly associated with cash. We 
notice here the absence of significant effect of return on equity and size.  
4.3. Financing decisions and the probability that the firm being a R&D-intensive firms: 
Logistic regression  
To ascertain that R&D intensity affects the financial policy, we ran also logistic regressions. 
We aim here to test the relation between financial policy variables and the probability that the 
firm belongs to R&D-intensive firms or non-R&D ones.   Because the debt is studied by two 
measures, leverage (total debt) and debt maturity (short term debt), and in order to avoid a 
substantially biased regression estimates due to the correlation between theses variables, we 
ran two logistic regressions. 
                                          R&D = γ 0 + γ 1 LEV+  γ 2 DIV + γ 3 CASH +  ζ (5) 
R&D = λ0 + λ1 SHTD +   λ 2 DIV + λ3 CASH + I (6) 
Where R&D is dummy variable equals one for the R&D- intensive firms and zero for 
the non-R&D ones. LEV is measured as total debt to total asset ratio. SHTD is short term debt 
and current portion of long term debt to total debt ratio. DIV is the dividend per share to 
earnings before extraordinary items. CASH is measured as the ratio of cash plus short term 
investment to total assets. 
The results of the logit regression, reported in table 5, confirm our research hypotheses. 
The financial policy variables present the predicted signs since the debt level and dividend are 
negatively associated with R&D dummy variable and the cash and short term debt are 
positively correlated with R&D intensity. These results indicate that firms with lower leverage 
and dividend payment and higher cash and short term debt are more probably to be R&D-
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intensive firms. All these financial policy variables significantly discriminate the R&D-
intensive firms from the non-R&D ones.   
Table 5. Financing decisions variables and the probability that the firm belongs to R&D-intensive firms or 
non-R&D ones: logit regression 
5. Conclusion  
The aim of this paper was to study whether R&D intensity affect the firm’s financing 
decisions. We have theoretically argued that R&D asset has three specific characteristics 
which may affect leverage, debt maturity, dividend payments and cash level.  
First, R&D is a non-redeployable asset with lower guarantee value for the creditors. 
According to the transaction cost theory, the firms more involved in specific assets support 
higher costs of debt and then prefer the internal finance to external one.  
Second, R&D asset generates large growth opportunities and in order to avoid the 
underinvestment and the asset substitution problem, the firms prefer internal finance to debt. 
If they have to finance by debt, the R&D-intensive firms prefer short debt term because it is 
more liquid then long term debt.  In addition, the growth opportunities decrease the free cash 
flow, and results in lower dividend payment.  
Third, R&D asset is also a major contributor to information asymmetry. The 
information about the R&D activity is less revealed by managers for not transferring 
innovation-related knowledge to rivals.  As a result, and in accordance with the Pecking Order 
Table 5. Financing decisions variables and the probability that the firm belongs to R&D-intensive firms 
or non-R&D ones: logit regression 
R&D = γ 0 + γ 1 TDTA + γ 2 DIVIDEND + γ 3 CASH +  ζ   (5) 
R&D =  λ0 + λ1 SHTD +   λ 2 DIV + λ3 CASH + I  (6) 
Variables 
R&D (5) 
( γ) 
R&D(6) 
(λ) 
Intercept -0,648
** -0.749** 
LEV -1,056
*** 
- 
SHTD - 0.565
** 
DIV -0,788
*** -0.645*** 
CASH 0,912
*** 0.808*** 
% corrected predicted 81.09 74.58 
R2 McFadden 0.175 0.163 
Note: The table presents the results of logit regression for the relation between financial policy variables and the 
probability that the firm being an R&D-intensive firm or non-R&D one. R&D is dummy variable which take the value 
one if the firms is an R&D intensive  firm and zero if the firm is non-R&D one. LEV, is measured as total debt to total 
assets ratio. Short term debt, SHTD, is the ratio short term debt with current portion of long term debt to total debt.  
Dividend payment, DIV, is measured as dividend per share to earnings per share before extraordinary items. ***, ** and * 
indicate that the t-statistics is significant respectively at 1% , 5% and 10% level.  
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Theory, R&D-intensive firms should favor the self-financing. Therefore, they exhibit lower 
dividend ratio and higher cash.  
Using a sample of European firms, the univariate and multivariate analyses results 
confirm that R&D-intensive firms exhibit a specific financial policy behavior. Indeed, R&D-
intensive firms exhibit lower leverage, lower dividend payment, higher proportion of short 
term debt and higher cash than non-R&D ones. These results confirm our hypotheses even 
after controlling for firm size, profitability, asset specificity, growth opportunities, risk, 
capital needs and non-debt tax shields. 
 
Footnotes 
1. Firms with lower R&D activities. 
2. See Long and Malitz (1985);  Balakrishnan and Fox (1993); Bah and Dumontier (1998 , 
2001); Hall and Lerner (2009). 
3. See also Coad and Rao (2010) for the test of the relation between firm growth and R&D 
expenditures. Del Monte and Papagni (2003) and Lee (2009) provide evidence that the 
effect of R&D intensity on firm growth varies according to the sector. Nunes et al. 2012 
conclude that the relation between R&D and growth differs between high-tech and non-
high-tech small and medium-sized enterprises.  
4. Bah and Dumontier (2001) use an arbitrarily classification. All firms with R&D to sales 
ratio higher than 5% are assumed to be R&D intensive firms. Firms do not report R&D 
expenditures are classified as non-R&D firms. 
5. Regressions are tested using panel data (pooled regressions). The fisher test of specific 
effect has rejected the hypothesis of the homogeneity. The calculated F value for the two 
models exceeds the tabulated F value. The results of the Hausman test indicate that the 
effects are random for the two equations. The probability (p-value) is higher than 5% for 
the two equations. We notice also that there is no significant multicollinearity in the 
independent variables (correlation matrix not reported for the sake of brevity). 
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